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In this work we theoretically disentangle the effects of pension provisions on a variety of financial incentives to re-
tirement, trying to reconcile them with some key Spanish retirement patterns. We find that the «average» individual,
who is never affected by any cap of contributions or benefits, has weak incentives to retire early and strong incen-
tives to retire at the normal retirement age. Alternatively, individuals at the bottom of the wage distribution have
strong incentives to retire as early as possible, as a result of the interaction between age-related penalties and the
minimum pension. Both findings perfectly accommodate the retirement hazard of medium and low earners respec-
tively. In contrast, high earners (those that have their contributions capped) do not retire early despite having strong
incentives to do so. This is because, for those workers, financial incentives are not a good proxy for the marginal
utility from working. Finally, we analyze the reasons behind the failure of the 1997 reform in improving the
sustainability of the Spanish public pension system.
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1. Introduction
Social Security systems all around developed world are faced nowadays with two
—widely documented— processes, that clearly threaten their financial sustainability: the ag-
ing of the population and the tendency towards early retirement. In the present work we fo-
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contract number HPMF-CT-2002-01626 is gratefully acknowledged.cus on this second issue, in particular the links between (early) retirement behavior and the
institutions or details a particular pension system is composed of. There are two reasons for
this interest. First, early retirement has a very important impact on Social Security burden
and the prospect of achieving a stable financial equilibrium 1. Second, the decisions to enter
and exit the labor market affect the dynamics of productivity and hence employment. This is
the case because lowering retirement age eliminates large amounts of human capital, and re-
duces the incentives for its accumulation.
The analysis of the effect of public regulations on retirement decisions has been ad-
dressed in the literature at various levels such us the study of implicit incentives (for exam-
ple, Gruber and Wise (1999) or Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998)); reduced-form models of re-
tirement (such us Samwick (1998)); models of conditional consumer decisions in a given
economic environment (Stock and Wise (1990) or Rust (1997)); and dynamic general equi-
librium models where the agents interact with a public institutional framework (for example,
 Imrohorolu et al. (1999)). For the Spanish case it is worth mentioning some work on re-
duced-form models of retirement such as Alba-Ramírez (1997); or Dynamic General Equi-
librium models (Rojas (2000), Arjona (2000) or Conesa and Garriga (1999)) and, finally,
evaluation of implicit incentives such as Boldrin et al. (1999).
In line with Gruber and Wise (1999) and Boldrin et al. (1999) we dissect the effects of
the key ingredients of a pension system in the financial incentives to retire 2. This type of
analysis exhibits several comparative advantages over more orthodox behavioral models,
such as computational simplicity, capacity to reproduce legal characteristics with a degree of
detail that cannot be achieved otherwise, and a very easy application to policy analysis. Furt-
hermore, in Jiménez-Martín and Sánchez (2003) it is shown that, for many workers, financial
incentives reasonably approximate the optimal retirement rule in a life cycle consump-
tion-leisure model 3.
More precisely, we analyze the financial incentives to stay in the labor force in a se-
quence of pension frameworks. We start off with a pension system characterized by a benefit
formula, a fiscal system and a contribution rule. On top of this system we add, one by one,
age and contribution history penalties, tax allowances, and finally, caps in benefits and con-
tributions. In all cases, we analyze the properties of the incentive measures from a diversity
of angles: according with the individual’s age (as in Gruber and Wise (1999)), real wage
level or wage growth rate. The implications of the analysis are illustrated with simulated
cases, using the parameters of the 1985 Spanish pension system (as detailed in appendix A).
We find that the interaction between age penalties and minimum pension generates
strong incentives to retire for workers at the bottom of the wage ladder. Alternatively, «aver-
age» earners have no incentives to retire at the early retirement age since they are unaffected
by the minimum pension. Both findings successfully mimic the observed retirement patterns
for both «low» and «average» Spanish wage-earners. However, in the case of high earners
whose contributions and benefits are both capped, financial incentives fail to replicate the
empirical retirement hazard at 60. This is so because the change in Social Security Wealth
(relative to wages) differs substantially from the marginal utility derived from staying active.
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a majority of workers, definitively less important.
What are the basic facts to be explained in the Spanish case? In the top row of Figure 4
we present the 1995 retirement hazard by age and gender for contribution groups 1 to 4 and 5
to 10 4. For men in contribution groups 1/4 only the peak at the age of 65 (in the hazard rate)
is really relevant. In contrast, for men in contribution groups 5/10 both the peak at the age of
60 (when benefit first become available) and at the age of 65, are clearly identifiable 5. In the
second and fourth rows of Figure 4 we present hazard rates for individuals aged 60 and 65, as
a function of the percentile of the expected wage at the age of 60. Low earners, most likely
affected by benefits floors, exit at 60 in a much higher proportion than medium or high earn-
ers. The evidence is less clear for women aged 60, for two reasons: their careers are much
more erratic and many of them do not have the right to retire early. Finally, hazard at age 65
is, regardless of the gender, important at all considered wage levels.
In our analysis of the recent 1997 Spanish pension reform, we find that it fails to reduce
both the importance of the incentives to retire early and the size of the Social Security’s lia-
bilities. Still, it produces some redistribution from above average pensions to below average
pensions, stemming from the different shape of the wage profile in either case. We show that
there are several (marginal) modifications of that reform that can reduce both early retire-
ment incentives and the liabilities of the system. Finally, we explore two proposals aimed at
providing incentives to stay in the labor force beyond the normal retirement age. We fail to
find strong retention effects for moderate premiums.
The structure of the rest of the document is as follows. In section 2 we describe the
framework where the analysis is undertaken. Section 3 reviews the instruments we use to
measure the incentives. The theoretical results are described in section 4. In section 5 we de-
scribe the Spanish Social Security system and analyze a recent reform bill and some other re-
form proposals. We conclude in section 6 with a brief summary of our findings.
2. The configuration of a PAYG public pension system
The individual decision to retire is affected by several public provisions. Acquiring con-
sciousness of this variety is interesting in the sense that it reveals the existence of more tools
for intervention than those considered in many quantitative studies of the pensions system
reform. In short, we mention:
— The formula for benefits and the fiscal and contribution rules.
— The eligibility criteria and the penalty for insufficient contributions.
— The possibility of early retirement and its penalization.
— Contribution caps: minimum and maximum level of contributions.
— Minimum/maximum pensions and their family considerations.
— Survival pensions and other tokens of generosity.
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ments. In this paper we articulate the revision of the pension system in two blocs: (1) Norms
that affect all individuals [the benefit formula, the fiscal and contribution rules (P0), and the
age- and contribution record penalties (P1)]; and (2) Norms that specifically affect individu-
als with extreme levels of income and/or benefits [tax allowances (P2) and maximum and
minimum contributions (P3) and benefits (P4)].
2.1. Benchmark pension framework (P0)
The benchmark framework introduces the minimal elements that define a pension sys-
tem in a stationary environment: A formula for computing the retirement benefit as the aver-
age wage income (updated for inflation) over a number of periods preceding retirement
(P00); a progressive tax system (P01); and a system of social contributions (P02), taking the
form of a constant payroll tax rate c, from which the system raises its revenue.
The Public Sector awards a retirement benefit, P, to any individual older than m. The
payment or benefit base is computed as the average of the last R annualized pensionable in-


































Note that only the R farthest BC are updated for inflation (I). Once P() is computed,
its value remains constant for the rest of the individual’s life.
Both labor and pension income are subject to taxation. We assume a progressive tax
scheme, with tax rates growing linearly with the size of the taxable earnings. In this case, the
net real labor income w is given by:
w = W –[ 0 + 1(1 – c) W] [(1 – c) W]–C = w(w0, ; 0, 1, c) W [2]
where C = cW denotes social contributions and w will be called the wage tax wedge. In a
similar fashion, net pensions can be expressed p()=p(w0, ; 0, 1) P(). Both tax ratios
w and p, depend on the wage growth rate () and its initial level (w0), apart from the param-
eters of the tax system. The ratio (w0, ; 0, 1, c)=p/w or pension tax generosity will be
useful when studying the effects of fiscal progressiveness on incentives.
2.2. Penalization schemes for early retirement and for insufficient
contributions (P1)
When determining the initial benefit, penalization schemes are commonly imposed on
individuals who either retire before a «normal retirement age» (N, the first age at which full
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following age (AP()) and contribution history (HP(n())) penalization schemes:
[3]
[4]
where M is the first age at which benefits become available and n() stands for the number of
years of contribution accumulated at age . Thus in economy P1 the initial (real) retirement
benefit is given by:
P()=AP() HP(n()) B(R, R, ) [5]
2.3. Tax-free allowances (P2), min/max contributions (P3)
and pensions (P4)
We introduce these provisions in three steps. First, in P2 we consider tax-free allow-
ances on labor and pension income,W A and B A, respectively. Second, in P3 we assume a
minimum level of mandatory contributions, C A (anchored in the calendar year A) that re-
places wage earnings whenever they fall short of this minimum. This minimum is assumed
to growth at the constant rate . Similarly, we assume the existence of a maximum level of
contributions C A which grows at the constant rate . Finally, in P4 we consider a unique
minimum pension scheme that complements the pension whenever it falls below that mini-
mum. Its evolution over time is entirely characterized by a starting level P A and a constant
rate of growth , namely the generosity of the system. The scheme for the maximum pension
works in a completely parallel way, being described by the parameters PA and .
3. Incentives measurement instruments
Incentive’s measures are conditional on the following set of assumptions:
 A1 Individual perspective: only the income that is personally enjoyed is considered.
 A2 Wages (pensions) are the only source of income while the worker is active (re-
tired).
 A3 There is a positive conditional probability of dying at any age in {1,..., F – 1}. At
age F such probability is one.
 A4 The individual does not expect changes in future public regulations.
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 Definition of incentives
In these circumstances, we define the following incentive’s measures for immediate re-
tirement of an individual aged  years old, with  in [0,..., T]:
Replacement rate, rr(): Expected net real benefit in case of retirement at age  divided
by w at .
P()=AP() HP(n()) B(R, R, )
(Horizon h) Social Security wealth, SSW( + h,): Current period  expectation of the
discounted present value of the flow of net pension benefits due from retirement at  + h
until F.
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where  = 1/(1 + r) denotes the time discount factor, which is related to a fixed interest rate r
and "(i | ) denotes the probability of being alive at i conditional on survival until age .
Horizon 1 accrual, acr(): Value of postponing retirement one period from , in terms
of change in the Social Security Wealth 6.
acr()=SSW ( +1 ,)–SSW (, )
Implicit tax, tax(): Value of postponing retirement expressed as a fraction of the ex-
pected wage w:
tax()=– acr()/w
3.1. Simulation design and base case characteristics
We undertake a longitudinal experiment. We place a base-case individual in a simple
economic and institutional environment and follow her as she becomes progressively older
(in the age range {0,..., T}). In particular, we compute the tax rates tax() that she experi-
ences at every age. To make explicit the calendar-time setting of the experiment, we link age
A for our base-case individual with a specific calendar year (that is then used as reference
for the institutional parameters and for the conversion to real quantities. See the details in ap-
pendix A). This context will be useful when dissecting the effects of the various pension
rules and when exploring the effects of some recent reforms of the Spanish PAYG system.
One of the essential traits of the set of public regulations is that individuals that differ in
age, labor history (occupation, contribution regime, participation and wage history) and fam-
ily or personal characteristics (survival) are treated differently. In the next section we study a
base case in which those characteristics are parameterized as follows:
 She is the unique member of an individual family with a constant (age independent)
mortality hazard ".
 She has an initial nominal wage, w0, and a contribution history of n(0) years at 0.
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= n()+1 .
 Her nominal wage growths at a constant rate , ie. w =( 1+) w–1.
4. Incentive analysis
In this section we obtain simplified analytical expressions of the incentive measures.
They will be very helpful in highlighting the dependence of the incentives on the key ingre-
dients of the pension system. Let us start with a decomposition of the social security wealth
in case of immediate retirement,
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where d = (1 – "), p is the initial pension and AT(, F) is the «Benefits Accumulator» from 
to F – 1 (from the perspective of age ). The Benefit Accumulator depends on the life hori-
zon and the future discounting. In case the individual considers postponing retirement by one
year, the new social security wealth would be:
SSW( +1 ,)=p( +1 ) AT( +1 ,F)–cW [7]
Denoting by # = $p()/p() the growth rate of real benefits, the Social Security accrual
associated to a 1 year postponement in retirement is:
acr()=p()( #AT( +1 ,F) – 1) – cW [8]
which leads to a simple formula for the unit-horizon tax incentive (for ages  M):
tax()=rr()(1 – #AT( +1 ,F)) + K [9]
where K is a function of labor and income tax parameters. By similar arguments, the tax associ-
ated with retirement in the age range (0,..., M – 1) (benefits are not immediately available) is:
tax()=– rr() #AT(M, F)+K [10]
Note that these formulae are valid regardless whether the real wage growth rate is con-
stant () or variable. The former case is explored in the next subsection, while the latter (re-
sults under a «more realistic» quadratic wage process) is left to section 4.2.
4.1. Incentive analysis when the real rate of growth of wages () is constant
4.1.1. Benchmark pension system (P0)
We review the incentive effects prevailing in the institutional setting P00 (benefit for-
mula), P00 + P01 (fiscal system) and P00 + P02 (contribution system).
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In the context of P00, the nominal benefit equals the benefit base. Furthermore, when 
is constant the benefit base is a fixed fraction of the current real wage. Hence, the replace-


































As shown in the top row of Figure 1, two elements have an impact on the retirement in-
centives. The first one is age: it makes a difference if the worker is older than M, the age at
which benefits are first available. The exit incentives are always lower before M because
waiting an extra year does not reduce the period in which benefits are received. The second
element is , the parameter giving shape to the individual’s wage profile. It has an inverse re-
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tax(), left; tax(w0), center; and tax(), right, in economies P1, and P1+ceilings
Parameter reference: P1+P30:  = 60, w0 = 0.700,  = –0.020; P1+P31:  = 60, w0 = 5.5,  = –0.020.
Figure 1. The effect on tax of contribution and pension ceilings
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 w0 lation with the tax: tax()/<0. In such a context, it is easy to proof that there exists a trig-
ger rate  =1 / AT( +1 ,F), slightly increasing with age, above which workers have an incen-
tive to stay active. This is because the only thing that could increase the individual’s Social
Security wealth is a wage jump large enough that the increase induced in the benefit base off-
sets the foregone benefit (during the additional year of work). It should be clear that this can
only happen if  is positive and sufficiently large.
A third element also deserves some consideration. Recalling that d = (1 – ), it is inter-
esting to note that since sign{tax()/d}=– sign{} the higher (lower) the individual dis-
counts the future (ie, mortality risk) the lower (higher) her incentives to stay in the labor
force when  <0(  > 0).
B. Progressive Fiscal System: P01
Under the progressive fiscal system described in section 2.1 both the replacement rate
(rr) and the rate of growth of the net real benefit () are functions of the individual’s age,
wage level and wage profile:
[11]
where (p/)/p, a ratio depending on the progressiveness of the system, smoothes out the
sensitivity of changes in the pension benefit (induced by postponing retirement one period)
to the wage profile.
In this case the threshold for positive incentives to work,  > 0, is higher; the curve relat-
ing the tax rate and  (ie tax()) slightly flattens; and the evolution of the tax() curve is only
marginally altered, remaining essentially flat; finally, since the sign{tax(w0)/w0}=
sign{} we find that, ceteris paribus, the richer an individual is, the higher the tax she faces,
when  > 0. So, strikingly, richer individuals are more strongly expelled (when the tax is pos-
itive) or more weakly retained (when the tax is negative). However, the degree of progres-
siveness that would be needed to make these alterations quantitatively important seems far
larger than the empirically relevant values.
C. Social contributions: P02
The effect of the contributions is twofold. On one hand, since K = c/(1 – c) in equation
[9] is positive, Social Security wealth obtained when retirement is postponed one period is
reduced by the amount of contributions paid during the extra year of work. On the other
hand, any given acr() represents now a larger fraction of the net wages (net of contribu-
tions). Formally, the new replacement rate is rr02 = rr00/(1 – c), exacerbating the incentives
encountered in P00. Therefore, for individuals with tax > 0 in P00 both effects reinforce each
other to increase incentives to exit. Alternatively, when tax < 0, the two processes go in op-
posite directions and the former result changes for  sufficiently large.
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  D. Summary of incentive effect in P0
Thus, in the context of P0 the tax(|w0; ) is almost constant before the age of first enti-
tlement m; it increases notoriously at that age and remains practically constant therefrom.
However, those individuals with steeper wage profiles (ie greater ) are pushed towards re-
tirement with greater strength. Both patterns are created by the benefit formula (P00) and do
not significantly vary when fiscal progressiveness (P01) or contribution payments (P02) are
considered.
Bearing these results in mind, we continue our analysis by enlarging the pension system
in P00 with penalization schemes (P1) (ie, for simplicity we abstract from the progresivity of
the fiscal system and the existence of contributions from here onwards). We then consider
tax-free allowances (P2), min/max contributions (P3) and pensions (P4). All these cases are
explored in two contexts: in the minimum pension system P00 and in the pension system en-
larged with penalties P00+P1. In this way we can separately identify the incentives affecting
«extreme» individuals (subject to truncations) from those affecting «normal» or «average»
individuals. The key results from the analysis are summarized in Table 1.
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Table 1
Summary of the incentive results in P00 and P00+P1
Provision Effect on P00 Effect on P00+P1
P01 Fiscal progressivity  < 0: Retains Expels 

 > 0: Expels 
P02 Social contributions Expel  < : Expel
otherwise: Retain
P1 Age and history
penalties Retain —
P20 Labor income reduce the absolute idem
tax-free allowances value of the incentive
P21 Pension tax <= 0 and ( < N): expel idem
tax-free  <= 0 and ( N): retain idem
P30 Minimum  < : Retains idem
(for  < 0) contribution otherwise: Expels
P31 Maximum  <  Retains idem
(for  < 0) contribution otherwise: expels
P40 Minimum  < 0: Retains Expels 

(for  > 0) benefits otherwise: Expels 
P41 Maximum  < 0: Retains Expels 

(for  < 0) benefits otherwise: Expels 
Notation. Retain (Expels): reduces (increases) tax(); Moderates: reduces |tax()| in absolute value; : threshold for a
sign switch of the tax in each economy.4.1.2. Age and contribution history penalization schemes (P1)
Two remarkable effects show up in the context of P1. First, there is an obvious reduction
in the replacement rate, which becomes rrP1 = AP() HP(n()) rr00. Second, the change in the
benefit resulting from staying active one more period rises as a result of the penalty schemes
being strictly decreasing in age. Reflecting this, # changes to #P1 =  +( 1+)  > #00, with
 a strictly positive function of age and of a number of parameters:  = (, !, , n()) > 0.
We detect three important consequences of the change in #. First, the threshold for posi-
tive incentives to work falls. It typically becomes negative at early ages. Second, as illus-
trated in the left central panel of Figure 1, the shape of the age profile of the tax rates changes
abruptly: At ages {0,..., M – 1} the tax falls; at age M a marked negative jump appears, in
clear contrast with what was observed in P0 (top left panel of Figure 1); in the age range
{M + 1,..., N} the tax remains relatively low, although it increases slightly with age until N
where a sudden positive jump allows it to catch up with its P00 value. Notice that there is an-
other possible jump, of smaller magnitude, when the insufficient contribution penalties fin-
ish 7. Third, the importance of the wage profile on the tax is softened.
Regarding the effect of the record of contributions in the context of P1, intuition would
suggest that individuals with incomplete histories must have less incentives to retire than
people with the same characteristics (, w0, ) but complete histories, due to the fact that the
former have a higher # than the latter. A more ambiguous result turn out after a more de-
tailed study. On one hand, there is an abrupt increase in the incentives with the end of history
penalties (when the number of years of contribution reaches nM). On the other hand, for ac-
tive workers the incentive can increase or decrease with n(0) depending on age and wage
profile. Grossly summarizing, we could say that individuals with incomplete history in most
cases have more incentives to keep working than their analogous with complete histories,
while age turns out to be a key variable when comparing among individuals with incomplete
histories. At early ages the tax decreases with n(0) (except for highly decreasing profiles), a
pattern that progressively reverses itself as the individual ages.
Summing up: the simultaneous consideration of P0 and P1 (see the central panels of Fig-
ure 1 and Table 1) unveils the incentives experienced by «average» workers. The essential
features are: (1) age penalties create a clear retention incentive at age M, that gets progres-
sively weaker with age and suddenly disappears at age N; (2) for a fixed age,  still has a
moderate influence on the sign and level (in absolute value) of the incentive; (3) before M
the tax is positive for individuals with a moderately decreasing salary  < k1 and negative
otherwise; finally (4) the wage level makes no difference as far as retirement incentives are
concerned.
What retirement pattern would be compatible with such incentives? That featuring an
exit rate increasing with age, with a pronounced peak at age 65. Early retirement at 60
would be chosen by a minority (only individuals with a very decreasing profile). Among
people of the same age, exit rates would be decreasing in the wage profile and flat in the
wage level.
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While the retirement incentives of «average» individuals are unaffected by tax allow-
ances, those of low earners, as illustrated in the bottom row of Figure 1, can be either re-
duced (because of the substitution of net by gross wages) or disrupted by small jumps at the
ages or wage levels separating the regions where tax allowances change form enabled to dis-
abled and vice versa. In either case, the effects are of small importance.
Tax-free allowances on retirement benefits are, by far, much more important. On one
hand, both rr and # increase, generating a step in the age-profile of the incentive and rein-
forcing the effect of the fiscal system. On the other hand, very intense punctual incentives to
work are created at the age where the tax-free allowance activates (when  < 0), with the op-
posite happening at the age where the tax-free allowances are deactivated (when  > 0).
These incentives show up as sudden discontinuities in the pattern of incentives by age. The
relevance of such discontinuities dampens when generalized incentive’s measures, such as
the horizon-h tax, are considered.
In most cases, both age or history penalization schemes increase the range of individuals
(specially those characterized by  < 0) that are affected by tax allowances on pensions. As
the individual ages and, consequently, penalties become less severe, the benefit tax-free al-
lowance can become no longer binding and incentives to stop working may appear (see the
left bottom corner of Figure 1 for an illustration).
4.1.4. The effect of floors and ceilings on contributions and benefits (P3 and P4)
As a rule, ceilings and floors on contributions and pensions reduce the dependence of the
incentive on personal characteristics. This is so because when the thresholds are fully bind-
ing, the accrual becomes constant regardless of the labor income level and/or profile. How-
ever, this general equalizing effect varies sharply with the particular threshold.
Ceilings: Maximum contribution and pension (P31 and P41).
The ceiling on contributions becomes fully operative when all the wages entering the
benefit base are above the legislated maximum. In such case [8] can be expressed as:
[12]
where p is the real pension when BB C () ( )   
 , and # is its rate of change. When the ceil-
ings on pensions are immediately binding after retirement the accrual is given by:
[13]
Both [12] and [13] reflect an accrual that is essentially independent of the individual la-
bor income process. The implication for the tax is clear: the larger the wage, the closer the
tax is to zero. There is, however, a remarkable difference between the effects of both trunca-
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   acr C p ()tions: the maximum benefit cancels out the effect of age penalties whereas the maximum
contribution does not. For this reason the effect of the maximum benefit is, as a rule, much
more important.
Figure 2 makes the entire story apparent: 1) For extreme wage processes (either very
high initial wage levels or growth rates) both regulations make the tax go to zero. 2) Maxi-
mum pensions turn the (typically) negative sign of the tax in the early retirement ages into a
positive one. This makes the tax, in practice, flat for  > m
8. In contrast, the maximum con-
tribution barely modifies the tax at those ages. 3) The simultaneous consideration of both
thresholds (bottom row of Figure 2) clearly shows that the quantitative effect of maximum
pensions is predominant.
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tax(), left; tax(w0), center; and tax(), right, in economies P0, P1, and P1+P2
Parameter reference: P0, P1:  = 60, w0 = 1.2,  = –0.029; P1+P2:  = 60, w0 = 1.7,  = –0.029.
Figure 2. The effect on tax in economics P0, P1 and P1 + P2
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 w0 Floors: minimum contribution and pension (P30 and P40)
The effect of floors (the minimum contribution and minimum pension) is similar to that
of ceilings: the analytical expressions are completely analogous and the accrual becomes es-
sentially flat when the floors are fully binding. As a result, the absolute value of the tax be-
comes arbitrarily large as lower values of w0 or  are considered (see the right and central
panels of Figure 3).
Some specific observations are, however, in order: 1) The existence of a minimum wage
regulation reduces the effects of floors, specially in the case of the minimum contribution
(which usually is related to the minimum wage). 2) Very low salaries are typically associated
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Figure 3. The effect on tax of contribution and pension floors
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 w0 to a positive tax at the age of first entitlement to benefits. (see the central top panel of
Figure 3 for an illustration). Furthermore, the minimum pension blocks the incentive effects
of both age and history penalization schemes. This creates a selective expulsion effect before
the normal retirement age on low-income workers, which (in accordance with Spanish em-
pirical patterns) is stronger the lower the salary considered. Notice that this is the empirically
relevant case for the long term unemployed, whose unemployment benefits fall with the un-
employment spell. 3) When considering both floors simultaneously, as in the bottom panels
of Figure 3, the effect of the minimum benefit largely dominates that of the minimum contri-
bution at the ages m, m +1 ,m + 2. However, as the individual approaches N the effect of
minimum contribution gains weight. 4) It is not the minimum pension by itself what in-
creases the retirement incentives but the interaction with age penalties. Notice that, in the
simulated case, the tax at all ages beyond N (where the penalties play no role) is reduced by
the benefits’ floor. This can be explained by considering the analytical expression of the ac-
crual when the threshold is not immediately binding:
where J is the minimum pension’s first-binding age. In absence of penalties, individuals with 
< 0 have  < 0 and, in consequence, a negative accrual (positive tax). When the threshold is
binding, the negative third term in the accrual’s expression is reduced, as AT(,J)<AT(,F).
The constraint accrual is then less negative and the expulsion effect is undoubtedly reduced 9.
Summing up, we have reported how the floors and ceilings on benefits block the incen-
tive effects created by the age and contribution penalties, with the result of fostering early re-
tirement. Note that this distortion will be more important as time passes for two reasons.
First, the legislated ceiling typically grows at a lower rate than wages. A good example can
be found in countries where earnings ceilings are price-indexed (eg Sweden) 10. In Spain, the
increasing incidence of the contributions ceiling has been documented in Boldrin et al.
(2002); Secondly, as the wage dispersion increases, the floor on benefits may also remain
binding for a significant part of the labor force.
4.2. Monetary incentives under a concave wage profile
In order to explore the influence of the wage profile in the results obtained so far, we
have simulated the incentives prevailing when the age-profile of wages is quadratic. The cur-
vature of the process is parameterized through ~ , the incremental rate between ages 0 and
N:
[14]
As commented at the beginning of section 4, expressions 9 and 10 are still valid in this
context. Thus, most of the effects found in the linear case remain unaltered. The most notice-
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 acr C p p AT J () () () ( )able differences, which arise through a more active role of the benefit formula, are summa-
rized as follows:
 The incentive increases strongly with age. The reason is twofold: first, because of
wages fall faster than benefits, which implies an increasing replacement rate; second,
because of the increase in 1 – # AT( +1 ,F) derived from the accelerated fall in #.
 The importance of the profile~  on the sign and the level of the incentive is lower. The
consideration of age penalties accentuates this effect to the point that the profile of
tax(~ ) is left nearly flat in ~ .
5. An application to the analysis of the Spanish Social
Security reform
In this section we explore the empirical relevance of the theory developed in the previ-
ous sections, and explore the impact of some reforms of the pension system in Spain. We
start by describing the General Regime of the Spanish Social Security system (RGSS). We
then check whether the empirical patterns of retirement for workers enrolled in the RGSS
match our theoretical incentive profiles. Finally we evaluate the implications of the 1997 re-
form in terms of retirement incentives, and consider a few proposals designed to give work-
ers enhanced incentives to stay in the labor market beyond 65.
5.1. Pension rules in the General Regime (RGSS)
We next provide a brief introduction to the pension rules in the General Regime (RGSS),
the most important pension scheme in the Spanish Social Security System (covering over 70
percent of the currently affiliated workers). We review its main characteristics both after and
before the changes implemented in 1997.
5.1.1. Financing and eligibility of the RGSS
The RGSS is a social protection system financed by the affiliates’ salary contributions.
The contributions are a fixed proportion of the pensionable earnings, a doubly censored ver-
sion of earnings. Both the censoring from below (minimum level of contributions) and from
above (maximum) vary according to professional category. Presently, eleven categories or
contribution groups can be distinguished. For the first seven groups, ranging from Engineers
and College degree holders to Administrative Auxiliaries, minimum and maximum are com-
puted for monthly salaries. For the remaining categories, minimum and maximum are com-
puted on a daily basis. The current rate of contribution is 28.3 %, of which 23.6 % is due by
the company and the remaining 4.7 % by the worker.
A minimum of 15 years of contributions is required to be entitled to a retirement pen-
sion, with the restriction that the final two must be within the ten years immediately before
retirement.
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Consider a 65 year old person fulfilling the eligibility criteria, who retires in month t af-
ter having contributed to the system for n > 15 years. Under the system in place from 1985 to
1997, his first theoretical monthly benefit is PH P n B tt
85 85 85 
 () , where the benefit base Bt
85 is
a weighted average of his monthly pensionable wage (base of contribution) BCt–j during the
96 months (eight years) immediately preceding retirement:
[15]
where It–j is the Consumer Price Index observed j months before retirement. Thus, earnings
in the two years immediately before retirement are not adjusted for inflation, while earlier
pensionable wages are converted into real terms but according with the price index prevail-
ing 25 months before the moment when retirement actually happened. The benefit base is di-
vided by 112 because pensions (and, usually, salaries) are paid in 14 monthly installments,
whereas Social Security contributions are levied on 12 installments. The penalty for insuffi-
cient contribution (HP85) depends on the number of yeas of contribution and is equal to
Thus, after contributing for 15 years the benefit is already equivalent to a 60 percent of
the benefit base. After contributing for 35 years the benefit equals the full benefit base and
there is no further advantage in contributing additional years, although these contributions
are mandatory until retirement.
5.1.3. Early retirement
The normal retirement age is 65, but early retirement from the age of 60 is permitted,
with a 8 percent annual penalty for every year retirement is brought forward from 65. This
early retirement option is only granted to the cohorts of workers affiliated before 1967.
It should be stressed that there are no clear incentives to postpone retirement beyond 65,
especially for those who have already contributed for 35 years when they reach 65. The only
indirect incentive to postpone retirement comes from the potential substitution of a «bad»
wage record for a «good» one. For those who have contributed for less than 35 years there
exists a small direct incentive derived from the increase in the history penalty. Note that the
incentive to work an extra year is different for two individuals of ages 60 and 65 having con-
tributed 34 years each. In the first case the benefit increases from 56.8 to 68 % of the benefit
base, while in the second case it only increases from 98 to 100 %.
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1125.1.4. Maximum and minimum benefit and indexation rules
Benefits are subject to a maximum that is legislated every year. For example, in 1996 the
maximum was 3.9 million pta./year, corresponding to approximately 4,3 times the minimum
wage and 1,63 times the mean wage for industry and services.
If the computed retirement benefit falls below the applicable minimum benefit (880.180
ptas./year in 1996 for people over 65 in charge of a spouse) and, if taking into account all
other sources of income, the individual earn no more than a certain annual threshold
(785.476 ptas. in 1996 as a general rule and 916.267 when there is a dependent spouse), he
receives a complement up to the minimum benefit of his class or, alternatively, up to the an-
nual threshold marking the limit to the right to complements.
Until 1986, benefits were indexed to real wage growth. From that year on, they are in-
dexed only to expected inflation, measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI). However,
due to periodical tokens of generosity, minimum pensions are linked to real wage growth in
practice.
5.2. Hazard patterns of workers under the RGSS
In this section we construct a number of representative empirical hazards, using infor-
mation from a sample of administrative records from the Spanish RGSS in 1995 11. We use
this information to check whether the theoretical incentive profiles are able to match the em-
pirical retirement hazards. When doing so we control for the following heterogeneity dimen-
sion: gender, age, contribution group and expected wage level at age 60. In the top row of
Figure 4 we present the 1995 retirement hazard rates by age and gender for contribution
groups 1/4 and 5/10, which can be assimilated to individuals with high-to-medium and me-
dium-to-low incomes respectively 12.
For men in contribution groups 1/4 the hazard peak at 65 is the only really important
one. In contrast, for men in contribution groups 5/10, both peaks at 65 and 60 (the year when
benefits are first available) are evident. For women (third row of Figure 4), whose sample
size is much smaller, the patterns are somewhat erratic. In fact, only the peak at 65 is very
important (peaks at latter ages being the result of the small number of observations avail-
able). Alternatively, the peak at age 60 is either less evident or non-existent. Boldrin et al. [4]
suggest that this may be caused by an the fact that an important fraction of women fail to
comply with the eligibility criteria for early retirement benefits.
In the second and fourth rows of Figure 4 we present hazard rates for individuals aged 60
and 65 as a function of the percentile of the expected wage at age 60. For men aged 60, re-
gardless the group of contribution, the figure is almost identical to the central top panels of
Figure 3. Low earners, most likely affected by benefits floors, exit at 60 in a much higher
proportion than medium or high earners. The evidence is less clear for women aged 60, for
two reasons: their careers are much more erratic and many of them do not have the right to
retire early. Finally, hazard at age 65 is, regardless of the gender, important at all considered
wage levels.
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Figure 4. Exit rates by age and expected wage at age 60 in HLSS/RGSS, 1995-sample
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15.3. The 1997 reform
The 1997 reform introduced three changes: (i) The number of reference years in the pen-
sion formula was set to go up from eight to fifteen years, on a year by year basis (the process
should be over in 2002); (ii) The penalty for insufficient contributions was replaced by the
following schedule:
and (iii) the early retirement penalty was reduced from 8 to 7 percent, for workers with a re-
cord of contributions of more than 40 years at the time of retirement. Note that this change
provides an extra incentive of 5 percentage points to those who have contributed more than
40 years when they become 60 years old.
It should be clear that (i) reduces the benefit base for those workers whose real pension-
able earnings grow continuously with age, and increases it for those who suffer reductions
during the last years of their active working life; (ii) reduces the theoretical benefit for those
workers who have contributed for less than 25 years, thereby increasing their probability of
being trapped by the minimum benefit; finally (iii) increases the replacement rate of those
who retire between the ages of 60 and 64 and reach, within this interval, 40 years of contribu-
tions, while leaving the rest of individuals unaffected.
Jiménez-Martín and Sánchez Martín (2000) show that only (i) is quantitatively im-
portant. When analyzing the RGSS sample, they find that the contribution bases in the
age range 50-65 are decreasing for workers in groups 5/10 and non-decreasing for wor-
kers in groups 1/4. Consequently, taking into account the difference in the wage levels of
these two groups (i) may lead to a redistribution from high earners’ pensions to low ear-
ners’ pensions. In contrast, they show that measures (ii) and (iii) only affect particular
groups of individuals. For example, measure (ii) is of little importance for men since
only 10 percent of males have contributed for less than 25 years when they turn 60. The
situation for women is just the opposite since most of them have contributed for less than
25 years (79.2 percent of those in groups 5/10). However the real incidence of that re-
form, as described in Boldrin et al. (1999) is of limited importance since many women do
not have the right to retire early. Finally, the impact of measure (iii) is of little importan-
ce since in neither case the fraction of those that have accumulated 40 years of contribu-
tions when they turn 60 is greater than 10 percent.
In Table 2 we explore the effects of the reform on the implicit Social Security debt. First
of all, the impact depends on the life-cycle dynamics of wages. For monotone increasing
wage profiles (ie,  > 0) the reform always reduces the implicit debt, while for decreasing
ones the debt augments for a broad range of wage levels. This is illustrated in the lower part
of the table, for workers retiring at the age of 60. Second, the reform increases the system’s
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13 5debt with workers of average wage, negative  and 40 years of contributions at the age of 60.
In contrast, for those who only have 30 years of contribution when they turn 60, the reform
alleviates the debt in case of retirement before the age of 63. In summary, the reform fails to
lower the Social Security debt in many, quantitatively important, cases.
5.4. Analysis of the 1997 reform
In this section we use the stylized theoretical model presented in section (4) to evaluate
the 1997 reform.
5.4.1. Evaluation of contribution history reforms
We consider the effects of modifications in the insufficient contribution penalties for in-
dividuals with average income (ie, not affected by wage level thresholds), which fits in the
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Table 2
Implicit Social Security debt under the 1997 system relative to the 1985 system
Age
Base case. Average wage at age 60
Forty years of contribution Thirty years of contributions
 =– 2  =2  =– 2  =2
55 0.905 0.923 0.903 0.921
... ... ... ... ...
59 1.038 1.016 0.918 0.895
60 1.026 0.981 0.937 0.891
61 1.026 0.951 0.962 0.888
62 1.035 0.925 0.996 0.885
63 1.048 0.904 1.030 0.883
64 1.059 0.890 1.059 0.890
65 1.095 0.888 1.095 0.888
66 1.137 0.885 1.137 0.885
... ... ... ... ...
69 1.559 0.878 1.559 0.878
% average wage
Base case at age 60
Forty years of contribution Thirty years of contributions
 =– 2  =2  =– 2  =2
25 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
50 1.208 0.984 1.113 0.978
75 1.190 0.981 1.099 0.891
100 1.027 0.981 0.937 0.891
150 0.953 0.953 0.863 0.863
200 0.953 0.953 0.863 0.863
Base case: Single, contribution group 5, average wage in 1993 and subject to the rules described in Appendix.framework of pension system P00 + P1. Recall that the analytical expression for the incen-
tive is this framework is:
[16]
Let us consider a new parametric scheme imposing uniformily heavier penalties (ie, set-
ting k1 > k1, k0 < k0, which implies that HP‘<HP). We leave the thresholds nm, nM unaltered.
The change in the incentive is driven by the simultaneous modification of rr and #.I ti s
straightforward to show that the replacement rate falls:
The alteration of # =  +( 1+)  operates through the change in  which, in turn, de-
pends on the relative change in the two parameters of the filter:
[17]
Despite the simplicity of the partial effect on the replacement rate and the parameter #,
the joint effect requires more elaboration: in most cases tax()’ < tax(), so the reform tends
to reduce the incentives to retire for workers with a positive tax and to increase the incentives
to work for people with a negative one. However, this effect weakens when individuals with
higher  are considered. In fact, for extremely positive wage profiles the reform may reduce
the incentives to keep working.
We can get to more precise conclusions by comparing the incentives faced by a base
case individual under three alternative penalties schemes: those in place before the 1997 re-
form (base or 1985 system), after that reform (namely, the Concave Reform) and under the
following alternative scheme (namely, the Convex HP reform):
Convex HP reform:
The left and central top panels of Figure 5 present the tax at age 60 as a function of  un-
der the three penalty schemes, for individuals with 30 and 20 years of contribution respec-
tively. The Concave reform does not introduce significant changes in the incentives of work-
ers with a record of n() / {25,35} when compared to the previous (1985) scheme, whereas
the Convex reform introduces a clear retention effect, inversely related to the value of . For
individuals with shorter histories (n() / {15,25}) the result depends on the wage profile.
Useful information about the impact of the reforms can be obtained by checking the im-
pact of the reforms on the threshold *. For the concave reform * is positive, thereby retain-
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11 # # 2   2 !( ! !( ! 11 00ing all individuals that are characterized by a decreasing wage profile (normally the less
skilled workers). Alternatively, under the convex reform, the threshold * is typically nega-
tive and quite large in absolute value, which implies that the exit incentives increase for all
the individuals characterized by  < *. However, for male workers, the latter case is practi-
cally irrelevant due to the small fraction of them (less than 10 percent) that have accumulated
less than 25 years of contributions at age 60. The situation is radically different for women,
since a majority of them have accumulated less than 25 years of contributions at age 60.
We conclude this section by exploring the impact of the alternative contribution-history
schemes on the Social Security debt. In the right top panel of Figure 5 we show the social se-
curity wealth of a representative individual (with average wage level and a mildly decreasing
wage profile) as a function of retirement age. As both reforms increase penalties with respect
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Reference. History of contributions: long n(0) = 30; short n(0) = 20. Individual characterization: left and middle pa-
nels: w0 = 24,  = 60 (left bottom panel  = 64); right panel: w0 = 2.4,  = –0.02.
Figure 5. Early retirement and insufficient contribution penalties: tax and SSW
after several alternative reforms
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to those existing before the 1997 reform, it is clear that both result in a relief for the Social
Security’s burden. In any case, the graph makes clear that the convex reform would imply
considerably larger savings, especially if workers were to respond to the higher incentives to
work by postponing their retirement age.
5.4.2. Reform of the early retirement penalty scheme
We now compare the effect on the incentives of the 1997 reform and an alternative re-
form with respect to the age penalization scheme applicable before 1997. The first one was
described in 3 and the alternative reform follows next:
In this section we study the effect of the changes in the age-of-retirement penalty scheme
introduced by the 1997 reform (point (iii) in section 3). We compare with the scheme in
place before the reform (section 3) and with an alternative reform characterize by the follow-
ing age penalties:
[Alternative AP Reform:]
Both reforms leads to smaller penalization than in the initial situation (ie, AP´>AP)
which implies larger replacement rates rr´ > rr. The real difference is in the timing of the al-
leviation. The 1997 reform reduces AP by 5 percentage points at the age of 60, by four points
at 61 and so on, whereas the alternative AP reform allows a one percent reduction at 60, two
percent at age 61 and so on.
We explore the impact on # first. We find an analytical condition analogous to [17] in
the previous section:
[18]
Both reforms have opposite consequences for #: while the 1997 reform reduces it, the
alternative reform increases it. The simulation results, presented in the left and central bot-
tom panels of Figure 5, are in this case sufficiently clear: while the 1997 favors early retire-
ment, the alternative AP reform has the opposite effect. Since the differential effect of these
two measures is higher at early ages, it is interesting to stress (see the right bottom panel of
Figure 5) that it is precisely at those ages when the financial cost for the pension system of
the alternative reform is lower than the cost of the 1997 reform. In any case, if individuals
were to respond favorably to the retention incentives, the final costs would most likely be
higher under the alternative scheme (as the effective retirement age should go up). Only if re-
tirement were to be postponed until 65 would the new reform have no additional costs.
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11 # # 2   2 (  (  11 005.4.3. Increasing the number of years of contributions used to compute the benefit base
In this section, we explore an extension in the number of years entering in the pension
formula’s benefit base, ie we assume R to be increased to R’, as in the 1997 reform. It is easy
to show that the new replacement rate in P00, rr´, is greater (lower) for workers with de-
creasing (increasing) wage profiles. Since 1 – # AT( +1 ,F) does not change, this reform
cannot change the sign of the tax for any individual. Therefore, it only strengthen the level of
the inicial incentive: at the early retirement age (where the penalties lead to a negative
threshold , usually lower than the steepness of the wage profile of the representative
worker) the reform increases the incentive to keep working; alternatively, at ages closer to N
the threshold  is positive and the reform reinforces the incentive to retire.
5.5. Introducing incentives to postpone retirement beyond 65
As in many economies, pension rules in Spain are actuarially unfair in case of delay-
ing retirement beyond 65. Recent reform proposals (to be applied by 2002 or 2003) aim
to extend active live by partially eliminating this discrimination. In this section we ana-
lyze two of the various possibilities that can help to motivate workers to keep working
after 65: 1) Eliminating the workers’s part of the total contribution (1/6th of Social con-
tributions in the Spanish case) for individuals working beyond 65; and 2) Allowing the
age penalty scheme AP to take values larger than one after age 65, thereby increasing the
benefit after age 65.
5.5.1. Eliminating mandatory contributions for 65+ workers in P0
Consider the case of an «average worker» considering working beyond 65 ( N = 65)
in the context of the pension system P0. If mandatory contributions were lift after age 65, the
new tax, would be:
where ‘=p/= p/(1 – 0 – 1W). Note that this reform increases the net wage and re-
duces the replacement rate. Consequently, the change in the tax rates takes the form:
It is straightforward to show that > (1 – c) w, which implies that tax´<tax, so that
the reform decreases the incentives for all ages above N. Notice that the progressivity of the
income tax is crucial for this reform to generate any retention effect. However, the retention
does not seems to be enough to offset the jump in the tax at age of N.
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This alternative reform introduces a small alteration of the penalty formula [3] after age
65. The new analytical expression is:
where  1 is the premium to keep working after age 65. Under such circumstances, we find
that,
where, under pension system P00+P1’, 1 
  #   11 1 () . This implies that tax‘–tax <0i f
the following inequality holds:
[19]
Given the fact that " > , this expression provides an upper bound on the generosity of
the premium. It is easy to see, in any case, that for a premium equal to the Spanish age pen-
alty (i.e.,  1 = 0.08) and a real rate of interest of 3 percent, the inequality holds comfortably
at all ages between 65 and 70.
6. Conclusions
In this work we analyze the effect of pension provisions and fiscal rules on the individ-
ual financial incentives to retire. We also show how this type of theoretical analysis can
greatly enhance our understanding of empirical retirement patterns in Spain. In particular,
we identify the precise economic mechanisms by which Social Security pushes low-wage
workers into early retirement.
Our first contribution is empirical: we (non-parametrically) estimate the retirement haz-
ard as a function of the expected (at age 60) wage level, at the key ages for the Public Pen-
sion System: the Normal Retirement Age N (65) and the Early Retirement Age m (60). We
find a remarkably clear negative relation at the age of 60, while no defined pattern emerges
at 65 (N). This new evidence complements the well known findings about abrupt spikes in
retirement hazards at both ages.
We then proceed to show how both patterns can be rationalized as the optimal response
to the incentives created by fiscal and social security regulations. To achieve this, we com-
pute the theoretical analogs of the empirical findings above: the life cycle profile of retire-
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1( 1 )ment incentives faced by agents of different wage levels, and the wage level profile of retire-
ment incentives faced by agents at different ages.
The life cycle incentives experienced by the average worker vary strongly with age, as a
result of the interaction between the pension formula and the early retirement penalties. The
incentives to retire before the age of first entitlement are mild as the pension is not part of the
opportunity cost of working. After m two forces pull in different directions: the opportunity
cost of the foregone pension and the imposition of early retirement penalties. Particularly in
the Spanish case, this second effect creates a very strong incentive to keep working until N.
Finally, after N the impact of the penalties disappears, the opportunity cost is at its maxi-
mum, and the average wage dynamics (which operate through the pension formula) tend to
reduce future pensions. All these forces together produce a sharp reduction in the incentives
to keep working, and provide a convincing explanation for the huge spike in retirement haz-
ard at the normal retirement age.
Life cycle incentives are very different for workers on both tails of the earnings distribu-
tion, as they become subject to the floors and ceilings on pensions and contributions. Minimum
pension is the most powerful device. By blocking the effect of early retirement penalties, it cre-
ates a strong incentive to retire at m on low income workers. This can account for the age 60
spike on the hazard by age, and for the decreasing profile on the hazard by wage at 60.
It is important to remark the critical role that age penalties play in this result. All the caps
and ceilings of the system, particularly minimum pensions, have the additional effect of pull-
ing apart the dynamics of the pension benefit form that of labor income. As earnings tend to
decrease at advanced ages, this isolation effect has the unexpected impact of reducing the in-
centive to retire stemming from decreasing wage dynamics. This means that all thresholds
have an expulsion effect in the age range {m,..., N} (when the age penalties guarantee that
postponing retirement results in a larger benefit), and a retention effect after N. It is also in-
teresting to note that the expulsion effect is lower for workers on the upper tail of the income
distribution. This is so because both the maximum pension and the maximum contribution
reduce the size of the benefit, which increases the opportunity cost of leaving the labor force.
A final aspect that deserves careful consideration is the process of annual updating on the
legislated values of the floors and ceilings. If they fail to keep pace with wage increases (as
in recent years), the incidence of the «truncations» on retirement behavior is due to increase.
Regarding the evaluation of the 1997 pension reform, we have not found any substantial
change in the retirement incentives, particularly on individuals who had shown a strong ten-
dency towards early retirement in the past. Its most noticeable effects are a slight reduction
in the implicit tax suffered by individuals with incomplete contribution histories, on one
hand, and a failure to lower the Social Security debt in many empirically important cases on
the other. Still, it produces some redistribution from above average pensions to below aver-
age pensions, as a result of the differences in the wage profile of each group. We propose
some small modifications in the design of the age and contributions penalties, which should
succeed in generating a simultaneous reduction in the retirement incentives (for the previ-
ously mentioned groups) and in the expected Social Security debt.
The effect of pension rules on retirement monetary incentives 61Finally, we have explored some recent proposals aimed at diminishing the actuarial un-
fairness of the Social Security formula after age 65. We find that the retention effect for
moderate premiums is of little importance.
Appendix
A. Calibration of the theoretical economy to the Spanish case
We replicate the institutional framework in place in 1993. The anchor age A is 60 years
old and the simulation period {0..., T} is {55,..., 70}. The discount factor d is 0.97 and the
institutional parameters take the following values:
Penalties Fiscal system and cont. thresholds
age history c 0.061 from below from above
0 0.6 !0 0.6 0 0.145 CA 0.88 C A 4.057
1 0.08 !1 0.02 1 0.022  –0.007 µ –0.006
M 60 nm 15 WA 1.0 PA 0.579 PA 3.438
N 65 nM 35 BA 1.2  –0.006  –0.019
Most of them are directly taken from the values in force in the anchor year. Others, how-
ever, need some interpretation. The contribution rate c is that corresponding to workers, for
whatever concept. For the contribution minimum, we select for CA the value observed for
group of contribution 5. To parameterize its time evolution, we took its average real growth
rate between 1984 and 1997. For the contribution maximum, we calibrate the base levelC A
in a similar fashion, while pinning down  is a bit more involved. This is due to a deliberate
effort to get a high degree of homogenization among the diferent proffesional categories in
this dimension. The result is that, from the beginning of the nineties, categories 1-4 share a
unique contribution maximum. This was achieved by increasing somewhat abruptly the con-
tribution maximums of categories 2 to 4, while letting the maximum for cat. 1 gently fall in
real terms. It is this latter pattern (less prone to cyclical variation and closer, in our opinion,
to a long term trend) what we wanted to include in the model. Therefore, we selected the av-
erage growth value from 1989 onwards. For the minimum benefits, we reflected the values
for single workers under 65. Finally, for the fiscal system, we fitted by Least Squares the re-
lation between the contribution bases and the tax payments suggested by equation [2]: a qua-
dratic polynomial without a constant term.
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Income process
Wj, wj = Before and After tax real labor income
w0 = Real wage level at age 0
,  = Nominal and real wage growth rate (wage profile)
= Curvature parameter of a quadratic model of wages dynamics
Contributions
Cj, c = Contributions paid at age j and pay-roll tax rate
HPs(n()) = Contribution History penalty under system s=85,97
n() = Length of contributory record
nm = Minimum number of years to be eligible for a pension
nM = Number of yeas required to achieve full pension rights
!0, !1 = Parameters of the insuficient contribution penalty scheme
= Legal floor & ceilings contributions
= Anchor levels for minimum and maximum contributions
, = Legal floor & ceilings growth rates
= Real pension when all relevant contributions are truncated
= Pension growth rate when all contributions are truncated
Fiscal system
w, p = Wage and pension fiscal ratios
 = p/w = Fiscal pension generosity
0, 1 = Tax system parameters
WA, BA = Labor income and pension income fiscal allowances
Pensions
B(R,R,)s = Benefit base under system s=85,97
BCj = Pensionable earnings at age j
Ij = Consumer Price Index at age j
P(), Pj() = Before and after taxes real pension in case of ret. at 
R(R) = Number of (indexed) years included in the benefit base
m, N = Early and normal retirement ages
AP() = Penalty for retirement before N
0, 1 = Parameters of the age penalties scheme AP(.)
Pt, Pt = Legal floor and ceiling on benefits
PA, PA = Anchor level for minimum benefit
PA = Anchor level for maximum benefit
, = Legal floor and ceiling growth rates
Incentive measurement instruments
[0, ..., T] = Range of possible retirement ages
A = Anchor age for calendar time events
rr(), (rrPxx()) = Replacement rate (in pension system Pxx) at age 
SSW( + h, ) = Social Security Wealth in case of retirement at  + h
acr(), tax() = Accrual and implicit tax at age 
 = 1/(1 + r) = Market discount factor
F = Maximum length of life
"(j|), " = Conditional survival probabilities (age-dependant or constant)
d = (1 – ") = Effective discount factor
AT(i, F) = Benefit acumulator
# = Growth rate of real benefits
= Marginal wage growth rate (for negative tax)
 = Combined penalties filter growth rate
J = First binding age for benefit truncation














1. The financial problems PAYG systems are bound to meet have triggered a substantial number of reform pro-
posals, most of them including sizable cuts in future commitments. See Kalisch and Aman (1998) for a sum-
mary of reform processes across OECD countries. In Spain, as noted by Herce and Alonso-Messeguer (2000),
it is expected an important imbalance in the public pension finances from 2020 onwards.
2. The first examples of incentive indicators can be traced back to Lazear (1976). In that paper, the remuneration
received by a senior worker encompasses not only his nominal wage but also the increase in pension rights ac-
crued by his decision to stay active.
3. There is one notable exception: the case of high earners whose contributions and benefits are capped. For this
particular group of workers the financial incentives and the marginal utility derived from work can differ sub-
stantially.
4. Contribution groups 1/4 and 5/10 can be assimilated respectively to individuals with high/medium and me-
dium/low incomes. The expected average monthly income at the age of 60 for a male (female) worker belon-
ging to groups 1/4 was 361.361 (306.644) in 1995 pesetas. The corresponding figure for groups 5/10 worker
was 182.189 (130.740). The data comes from a database of administrative records from the social security
system (see Boldrin et al. [1999] for a description of the source).
5. For women, whose sample size is much smaller, the patterns are somewhat erratic. In fact, only the peak at 65
is very important (peaks at latter ages mainly reflect sample noise induced by the small number of observa-
tions available). The peak at age 60 is either less marked or all together non-existent. As noted by Boldrin et
al. (1999), the main cause for that latter observation might be that an important fraction of women are ineligi-
ble for early retirement benefits.
6. A generalized version of the accrual, namely the «peak value», has been recently introduced in Coile and Gru-
ber (2000).
7. Decreasing tax profiles are possible at ages {M + 1,..., N – 1} for individuals with increasing wages.
8. Before m the opportunity cost do not include the lost pension, irrespectively of how it is computed.
9. When the threshold is binding at age  the accrual is acr C P ()      and the final effect on the incentive is
unclear: the negative effect derived from the fact that  < 0 is removed but, at the same time, the opportunity
cost of the lost pension grows.
10. This fact has been taken into account in the recent reformulation of the Swedish pension system —see Scher-
man (1999), page 9—. In the new public pension scheme the pensionable earnings ceiling is indexed to wages.
11. See Boldrin et al. (1999) and (2002) for a description of the source.
12. The expected average monthly income in 1995 for a 60-years-old men (women) was 361.361 (306.644) pese-
tas for workers in groups 1 to 4. The corresponding figures for workers in groups 5/10 were 182.189 (130.740)
pesetas.
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Resumen
En este trabajo exploramos teóricamente los efectos de las disposiciones de pensiones sobre un cierto número de me-
didas de incentivos financieros para la jubilación, y tratamos de reconciliar los resultados con las pautas fundamenta-
les de jubilación en España. Encontramos que los individuos promedio (aquellos que nunca se ven afectados por los
The effect of pension rules on retirement monetary incentives 65topes en las pensiones o contribuciones) tienen escasos incentivos para la jubilación anticipada y muy fuertes para
jubilarse en la Edad Normal. En marcado contraste, individuos en el extremo inferior de la distribución de ingresos
tienen un incentivo muy fuerte a jubilarse lo antes posible, como consecuencia de la interacción entre las penaliza-
ciones de jubilación anticipada y la pensión mínima. Ambos descubrimientos encajan perfectamente con las proba-
bilidades condicionadas de jubilación empíricas para trabajadores de ingresos medios y bajos respectivamente. Por
el contrario, los trabajadores de ingresos altos (aquellos que ven truncadas superiormente sus contribuciones socia-
les) no anticipan su jubilación pese a tener incentivos importantes para hacerlo. Esto se debe a que, para estos traba-
jadores, los incentivos financieros no proporcionan una buena aproximación a la utilidad marginal de trabajar. Final-
mente, analizamos las razones que han llevado al fracaso a la reforma de 1997 (en su intento de mejorar las
expectativas financieras del sistema de pensiones español).
Palabras clave: jubilación, Seguridad Social, Incentivos monetarios, Reforma del Sistema de Pensiones, España.
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